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Abstract   This paper presents the economic theory of information, reflected by
differing demand for and supply of products in the presence or absence of cer-
tain attributes. This theory is applied to the market for seafood and reviews the
use of this framework in the empirical literature. Product attributes can be
search attributes (demand for the product found with the lowest price or con-
tained in preferred packaging), experience attributes (demand for a product
because of previous experience with the product’s taste or ease of preparation),
and credence attributes (preference for products with attributes which must be
identified as present by a trusted source, such as safety or recyclability). It is
highly likely that, given today’s competitive market for seafood and consumers’
interest in knowing more about the products they purchase, the market for sea-
food with desired attributes will continue to evolve.
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Introduction
It should not be news to anyone in the seafood industry or those who study seafood
markets that, despite forecasts of declining worldwide seafood supply, selling sea-
food has become increasingly competitive. Some of the competition has come from
the aquaculture sector, which has historically focused on quality attributes of the
product. The fishery sector has, on the other hand, only recently paid attention to the
quality of their products. As a result, Pacific wild-caught salmon has seen its market
shares erode in the world market, particularly in Japan, due in part to increased sup-
plies of higher-quality farmed salmon. However, as management practices have
changed, the fishery sector has been able to increase the quality of its products. For
example, the quality of product coming from the Pacific halibut fishery has greatly
improved since the fishery switched to ITQ management (Homans and Wilen 1997).
Formerly supplied as frozen product with a single large pulse into the market, the
halibut fishery now provides a higher-quality product available in the fresh market
over a longer time period.
In this climate, producers of seafood, both farmed and wild, have begun to dif-
ferentiate their products with country of origin, brand, nutritional, or environmental
labels.1 This is driven by their belief that consumers prefer some product attributes,
such as domestically produced and environmentally benign, more than others. If
their product already has such attributes, producers will supply this information as
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long as the marginal cost of providing the information is less than the marginal ben-
efit. Providing this information may increase their market share at the expense of
those producers who cannot make the same claims. If their product does not have
the desired attributes, then the producer must decide whether or not to invest in
changing the attributes of the product.
On the other side of the market, consumers throughout the world have become
interested in knowing more about the food products they buy, particularly regarding
food safety, but also several other attributes. The success of markets for organic
fruits and vegetables and free-range chickens are among the most widely known ex-
amples. Consumer boycotts of canned tuna prior to the implementation of dolphin-
safe capture is an example where consumer demand for dolphin-safe tuna replaced
demand for “dolphin-unsafe.” Another example of consumer demand for informa-
tion on product attributes was the nationwide attempt by consumer advocate groups
in the U.S. requesting that the federal government require labeling milk as to
whether it came from hormone-treated dairy cows. In this case, the consumers
wished for a regulatory solution, rather than a voluntary solution, by the milk indus-
try. However, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) decided that there was
no public benefit in providing that information on milk cartons, as there are no
known health risks of drinking milk from bST-treated cows. Thus the initiative
failed, even though there was consumer demand for this information.
Consumers may be concerned about the impact of fishing practices on dolphins,
seals, sea lions, or other marine mammals, and be willing to search for and possibly
pay more for seafood products that do not impact these animals. It is, however, pos-
sible that in some cases increased information on attributes of some products will
not yield additional value to the consumer or change consumer behavior. Consumers
may not be at all concerned that some fishing practices kill significant numbers of
sharks and that the availability of clearly identified products from fisheries with
lower shark bycatch will not change their purchasing behavior. In yet another ex-
ample, the “cuteness” factor may come into play. Marine mammals tend to be per-
ceived as “cute and cuddly,” whereas a mackerel is not. There may be more public
sentiment for the cute and cuddly mammals versus the scale-covered fish. Thus, ad-
ditional information on the environmental impacts of some fisheries is likely to be
valuable to consumers for some marine species, but not necessarily for all. This, of
course, will vary by consumer.
The purpose of this article is to present the theoretical framework for the eco-
nomics of the market for information regarding product attributes, and to reveal the
use of this framework in the empirical literature related to seafood. This article is
organized in the following manner. First, the economic theory of information is dis-
cussed, providing the framework for analyzing consumer demand for information.
Next, a discussion of the market for attributes is offered, along with a categorization
of types of food attributes typically of concern to consumers. A brief review of the
empirical literature on consumer preferences for seafood attributes is presented. Fi-
nally, conclusions of this discussion on labeling in seafood markets are summarized.
Economics of Information
The underlying economic theory for labeling products can be traced back to
Stigler’s (1961) work on the economics of information. Stigler portrays information
as a valuable resource. The focus of his paper is on the search for the lowest market
price. Determining the pool of sellers, and prices demanded by each seller for a
good, is a time-consuming task. Thus, there is a “search cost” attributable to time
and energy expended by the consumer in determining the seller with the lowestMarkets for Seafood Attributes 155
price. Of course, the higher valued the good is, the greater might be the benefit of
searching; conversely, the higher one’s income, the higher the opportunity cost of
searching for the lowest-priced seller. In other words, the more valuable one’s time
is, the more expensive the search cost becomes. According to Stigler, then, a con-
sumer searches for information until the marginal benefit of additional information
is equal to the marginal cost of obtaining the additional information. As a result,
there is a willingness to pay for information, and a marginal cost of obtaining it.
Stigler did not discuss search costs in the context of finding the highest quality
product. Search cost for quality was addressed by Nelson (1970; 1974). The diffi-
culty of determining product quality in the market is even greater than that of deter-
mining price levels, since information about quality is usually more difficult to ob-
tain. In addition, since it is often impossible for buyers to tell the difference between
good products and bad products, there are incentives for sellers to promise high-
quality products but market poor-quality products, as pointed out by Akerlof (1970).
Nelson distinguished between two types of products, search goods and experi-
ence goods. Search goods are those that one can determine the quality of by search-
ing, where quality for seafood might be defined as price, color, or smell. One dis-
cerns quality of experience goods by experiencing the taste, durability, or prepara-
tion.
Search and experience goods may be advertised by producers to provide con-
sumers with information on the lowest prices and highest quality among stores in
their area along with other information. This will lower the consumer’s search costs.
Search characteristics, which can be readily checked by the consumer before pur-
chase, are hypothetically the most accurately advertised. The producer elects to un-
dertake the advertising as long as he sees this as a means to increase market share.
Consumers’ acceptance of producers’ claims will vary by the nature of the character-
istic advertised, since producers will generally disclose only information advanta-
geous to them. This competitive disclosure process results in explicit claims for all
positive aspects of goods, and causes consumers to be suspicious of goods without
claims (Aldrich 1999).
Darby and Karni (1973) expand the categorization of goods to include credence
goods. Credence goods are more complicated in that consumers cannot determine
the product’s quality even after they buy and consume it. In this case, we truly have
an imperfect market because first, there is asymmetry in possession of knowledge
between producer and consumer, and second, because it is not practical for consum-
ers to assess the quality of the product. For example, it is impractical or impossible
for consumers to perform laboratory tests for the safety and nutritional value of sea-
food they purchase. Similarly, the environmental friendliness of a good is an at-
tribute of credence goods, since it is, in general, infeasible for the consumer to ob-
serve the production process. According to Caswell (1998), labeling can transform
credence attributes to search attributes that allow the consumer to judge quality of
the good before purchase.
For credence goods, one may rely on producer claims, but generally consumers
place more trust in an independent third party to provide truthful information on
quality. In this case, either a third-party private certification is used, or there may be
government regulations mandating certain product characteristics be revealed to the
consumer by means of government testing or inspections.
Demand and Supply of Attributes
Hooker and Caswell (1996) created a list of examples of food product quality at-
tributes, which is reproduced in table 1. These attributes apply equally to seafoodWessells 156
and other food products. The table has a mix of search, experience, and credence
goods. For example, all the food safety, nutrition, and process attributes could be la-
beled as credence goods, while some of the value attributes (e.g., size and appear-
ance) are search attributes. Experience goods may include taste, convenience of
preparation, and package attributes.
Recognizing that attributes like these have value to consumers, Lancaster
(1971) characterized consumer demand for products instead as consumer demand
for a bundle of attributes, where each product has one or more attributes. The es-
sence of Lancaster’s framework is that a good by itself does not yield utility, but it
Table 1
Quality Attributes of Food Products
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possesses characteristics (attributes) that create it. Therefore, there is a demand for
attributes in the marketplace. There is also a supply of attributes. On the axes of fig-
ure 1 are the prices of different quantities of an attribute per unit of food, and quan-
tity as measured by the quantity of an attribute per unit of food (A/Q).
The various demand function, D, represents consumers’ willingness to pay for
various amounts of attributes at different income levels. The demand curves are
downward sloping to signify that for any level of income, the lower the price of
quality per unit of food, the more consumers are willing to purchase. The line D3 repre-
sents the highest income level, while D1 represents the lowest. Thus, if increasing envi-
ronmental friendliness is a superior product, then demand will shift up as the con-
sumer becomes more affluent. If we return to the earlier example that consumers
may not have a demand for shark-safe seafood, then one would not expect to see a
demand curve in figure 1. Thus, there may be no market for shark-safe seafood.
In this graph, S represents supply of the attribute per unit of food. The attribute
might be increasing levels of quality as measured by environmental friendliness, and
the growth of marginal cost implies an increase in marginal costs as the industry
supplies more environmental friendliness. Environmental friendliness is not a dis-
crete choice, but instead a continuous range of friendliness. An example to consider
might be a groundfish fishery. The cost of reducing marine mammal bycatch might
be relatively low. Additional costs are incurred if the fleet also reduces incidental
take of non-target species. Finally, even greater costs would be incurred if, in addi-
tion, gear type was changed such that there was no damage done to the ocean floor
by draggers. These costs are not likely to be fixed costs, thus, as environmental
friendliness (or protection of the marine ecosystem) grows, the marginal cost of sup-
plying it increases. In contrast, quantity of fish sold will shift the supply curve up
and down if the size of the stock affects the cost of supplying various levels of envi-
ronmental friendliness.
Alternatively, perhaps the only criteria for environmental friendliness that a
fishery must meet is to avoid overfishing. In other words, the fishery is either envi-
Figure 1. Demand and Supply of Food AttributesWessells 158
ronmentally friendly or it is not, where that level of friendliness is measured by
whether or not the fleet catches too many fish. Then, the marginal cost of providing
more “environmental friendliness” is constant. No matter what the price, the level of
environmental friendliness will not change; i.e., the industry either fishes too much
or it does not. If it meets those criteria, then the supply curve for quantity of at-
tribute in figure 1 becomes a vertical line, and it is only the demand for environmen-
tal friendliness that determines the market price. One can argue that this is the case
for ecolabeled seafood products under the Marine Stewardship Council’s (MSC)
program.2 The cost of certifying a fishery is fixed, as there is one level of environ-
mental friendliness — that the fishery is well managed as defined by the MSC’s
standards and criteria. The level of environmental friendliness is constant. There is
no gradation of being “somewhat well managed.” Thus, the supply curve in figure 1
will be vertical. If the size of the fishery matters to the cost of supplying a well-
managed fishery, then the supply of environmental friendliness will just shift the
curve left or right.
Finally, on the supply side of the market there are the issues of producers choos-
ing not to supply product attributes in the cases where their private marginal costs
outweigh their private marginal benefits, although the social benefits of the provi-
sion of both attributes and information about the attribute outweigh social costs.
Asymmetry of information and a market failure to supply that attribute and/or infor-
mation to the public becomes the main issue. Food safety is a classic example.
Review of Empirical Literature on the Market for Seafood Attributes
On the demand side of the market for product attributes, Lancaster’s work has been
the underlying theory that is used to couch much of the economic analysis that has
been done evaluating consumers’ preferences for seafood safety,3 seafood
ecolabeling,4 and other seafood attributes.5 By viewing the characteristics of a sea-
food product as quality, safety, price, production process, taste, color, etc., one can
use Lancaster’s theoretical framework on which to base empirical studies of the
marginal value of each attribute to the consumer.
One approach is to analyze the value of individual food attributes using hedonic
price models. Hedonic analysis relies on having data on product prices and the pres-
ence or absence of the individual product’s characteristics that go into determining
that price. Such data are often very difficult to find, and thus limit our ability to de-
termine values of attributes in the market. In spite of that, a recent example of a
data-intensive hedonic model is presented in Carroll, Anderson, and Martinez-
Garmendia (2001), who evaluate the relative value of particular attributes in deter-
mining prices of Atlantic bluefin tuna in the Japanese wholesale market. The basic
methodology of hedonic analysis is to estimate an equation using cross-sectional
price data regressed on variables representing the presence and absence of specified
attributes where each fish is an observation. A large dataset on prices attained in the
Japanese market, by agent, as well as the attributes of each fish sold enabled the re-
searchers to uncover unprecedented information about the value of each attribute
compared to the other attributes. Results indicate that attributes, including freshness,
fat content, color, and shape, had the largest influences on the price level for bluefin
2 For more information on the MSC go to www.msc.org.
3 Wessells, Kline, and Anderson 1996.
4 Johnston et al. 2001.
5 Holland and Wessells 1998; Carroll, Anderson, and Martinez-Garmendia 2001; Wirth, Halbrendt, and
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tuna sold in the Tsukiji Central Wholesale Market in Tokyo. For example, fish with
the highest fat content grade were estimated to receive a price 76% higher than that
of the lowest grade. Fat content in bluefin tuna on the Tsukiji market is an experi-
ence attribute, since the buyers know to look for the fish with the highest fat content
(holding everything else constant). It is also a search attribute, since the buyers test
each fish to determine its fat content grade. Even the name of the broker handling
and selling the fish had an affect on the price paid. Thus, hedonic analysis can re-
veal the value of information, but is limited to the success of the data set in its abil-
ity to differentiate the various pieces of information that might be pertinent to the
determination of product price.
In cases where the market does not exist, for example when the product with
certain characteristics has not reached the market, the framework used has been con-
joint analysis or contingent choice. Studies of product differentiation using these ap-
proaches include Wessells, Kline, and Anderson (1996), Holland and Wessells
(1998), Holland and Wessells (1998), Anderson and Bettencourt (1993), Wirth,
Halbrendt, and Vaughn (1991), and Johnston et al. (2001).
Characteristic of both conjoint and contingent choice approaches is that con-
sumers reveal preferences as each is presented with tradeoffs among product at-
tributes. In conjoint analysis, a survey is presented to respondents in which they
rank product choices, based on the bundle of attributes representing the products.
For example, in Holland and Wessells (1998), 9 hypothetical fresh salmon products
were presented to each of more than 1,500 survey participants. Respondents were
asked to rank these products from most to least preferred (1 to 9). Product attributes
that changed were price, production information (farmed vs. wild vs. no informa-
tion) and seafood safety inspection information (U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA), FDA, or no information). For example, out of the 9 products, a consumer
may have chosen as his/her top choice the lowest-priced salmon with no information
on production process but inspected by the FDA, followed by a second choice of the
medium-priced salmon that is identified as being farm-raised and inspected for
safety by the USDA, and so on.
Estimation using a rank-ordered logit model (Beggs, Cardell, and Hausman
1981) showed the attribute that was most important to those respondents, by far, was
seafood safety inspection. Any inspected salmon portion was much more likely to be
ranked first than another, regardless of production method or price. Seafood safety
is certainly a credence good, but the respondents were mostly indifferent to which
agency did the inspection. Information on farmed and wild-caught production are
also credence goods at the retail level, since there is generally no means by which a
consumer may determine the production method themselves. Price, on the other
hand, remains a search good, as in Stigler.
Another methodological approach chosen for empirical analyses of consumer
preferences for seafood has been to use contingent choice models. Johnston et al.
used contingent choice as the methodology to discern consumers’ tradeoffs between
products with different attributes, particularly ecolabeling. The primary reason for
using contingent choice is that there does not exist market data from which we can
compare consumer demand for ecolabeled seafood to non-ecolabeled seafood.6
Ecolabeled seafood was defined as a product that came from a fishery which was
certified not to be overfishing its stock. In this case, a series of paired comparisons
6 Canned tuna is somewhat an exception, in that it is possible to estimate demand for dolphin-safe
canned tuna using supermarket scanner data, as in Tiesl, Roe, and Hicks (1997). In this case, however,
there is no choice that consumers can make between dolphin-safe tuna and “non-dolphin-safe,” such that
Tiesl, Roe, and Hicks can only report that demand for canned tuna shifted post-1989 after only dolphin-
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for ecolabeled versus non-ecolabeled seafood products was devised in surveys of
1,640 U.S. and 2,000 Norwegian consumers. In this project, the respondent was
asked to indicate which of two hypothetical products (s)he would choose to buy,
where one choice may have been certified cod for $5.49 per pound versus non-certi-
fied cod at $4.99 per pound, in the U.S. survey. Similar questions were also posed
for shrimp, and prices were changed to Norwegian kroner for the Norwegian survey.
Johnston et al. (2001) find substantial divergence between Norway and the U.S.
concerning the impact of a wide range of variables. Using a logit model, choice of
certified is regressed against price, demographic attributes, preference attributes,
and environmental purchasing behavior of the respondents. The findings are that
consumers do choose certified seafood over non-certified, although an increase in
the price premium has a negative impact on consumers’ likelihood of choosing
ecolabeled seafood. Although the effect holds in both countries, it is more pro-
nounced in Norway. Therefore, in this hypothetical case, there is an implied value to
the consumer of sustainability, which in our earlier context is a credence attribute.
There is another determinant of the value of the credence attribute,
sustainability. Namely, how much trust is placed in the truth of the sustainability
claim? With seafood safety, it was determined that the credence attribute was impor-
tant, but which of the two possible agencies provided it (FDA or USDA) was mini-
mally important. This survey on ecolabeling asked respondents to indicate which of
a list of agencies would be most trusted to guarantee certification. U.S. respondents
could choose among the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), the MSC, and the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). Norwegian respondents were given a choice
among WWF, the MSC, and the Norwegian Fisheries Directorate (NFD).
Of the agencies considered by U.S. respondents, NMFS garnered the highest
trust ratings, with 49% of respondents indicating that they would trust this agency
most to provide certification. WWF was chosen by 23% of respondents, and MSC
by 5%. The remaining 23% indicated that they were unsure of their most trusted
agency. Approximately 81% of Norwegian respondents indicated that they would
trust the government agency most to provide certification. WWF was chosen by
16% of Norwegian respondents, and the MSC by 3%. Private (e.g., seafood indus-
try) certification organizations were not considered, as prior research regarding sea-
food safety indicates that seafood consumers place relatively little value on guaran-
tees offered solely by industry groups (Wessells and Anderson 1995). Model results
support the hypothesis that certifying agency is important, but only for Norwegian
consumers. More specifically, in cases where the agency identified by the respon-
dent was also the most trusted agency specified as guaranteeing seafood certifica-
tion, Norwegian respondents were more likely to choose the certified product than
U.S. consumers.
Thus, the empirical literature on the demand side of the market for seafood at-
tribute information is well established, although there are many more questions yet
to be studied and answered. The other side of the market for attributes, the supply
side, has not been investigated. There are studies of the cost of providing food
safety in, for example, the meat protein markets, and of providing the information
regarding the safety of the products (Caswell 1998). There have not been any studies
determining the cost structure of supplying seafood safety, environmental friendli-
ness, or other attributes, nor have there been studies of the costs of supplying this
information to the consumers. Perhaps more importantly, the question whether the
marginal costs of supplying such attributes outweigh the marginal benefits of doing
so has been neglected. As the seafood industry continues to become more competi-
tive, obtaining answers to these questions will become more pressing.Markets for Seafood Attributes 161
Conclusions
This paper has presented the economic theory of information from the context of the
value of information to consumers, reflected by differing demand for products in the
presence or absence of certain attributes. These attributes can be search attributes
(demand for the product found with the lowest price, or contained in preferred pack-
aging), experience attributes (demand for a product because of previous experience
with the product’s taste or ease of preparation), and credence attributes (preference
for products with attributes which must be identified as present by a trusted source,
such as safety or recyclability). There is a resulting market for attributes, for which
there is market demand as well as market supply.
As applied to seafood markets, demand for attributes certainly exists, as does
the demand for information about those attributes. In the empirical studies discussed
above, there is a demand for information on product quality, seafood safety, environ-
mental friendliness, and even the name of broker of the individual bluefin tunas sold
in Tsukiji market. The analyses indicate that these attributes are valuable to the con-
sumer, and they are willing to pay for them. However, demand is subject to the na-
ture of the attribute. In other words, there are some attributes consumers may attach
value to, and some they may not. In that case, there is no market for information, or
in other words, figure 1 has no demand curve.
Although not included in the list of empirical studies, the supply side of the
market for attributes also exists, but there are no empirical studies to date examining
this portion of the seafood market. We know from the economic framework that pro-
ducers may supply attributes and inform consumers of them only when the private
marginal costs are less than the marginal benefits. However, in contrast to the lack
of a market for attributes when consumers do not have a demand, in cases where the
supplier does not enter the market for attributes does not necessarily mean, there-
fore, that there is no market. If the government perceives there is a social benefit to
the provision of product attributes or information, then there may be regulatory
steps taken that force producers to expend resources to do so, and this action may
lead to the presence of a marginal cost curve in figure 1 regardless.
It is highly likely that, given today’s competitive market for seafood and con-
sumers’ interest in knowing more about the products they purchase, the market for
seafood with desired attributes will continue to evolve. As a result of this, consum-
ers may find themselves inundated with information. For example, one can look at
the salmon market. Within a short while, it is likely that consumers will be able to
buy salmon with a variety of attributes, including wild, farmed, organic, ecolabeled,
Atlantic, Pacific, Alaskan, Chilean, Canadian, Norwegian, Irish, Scottish, quality
control measures, and nutritional content. Some of these attributes may have a value
for which the consumer is willing to pay. Equally, there is a potential for confusion
if there are too many labels. For example, what is the difference between organic
and ecolabeled? The extreme case of confusion is a lack of interest on the part of the
consumer. Then, the framework presented above tells us that there will no longer be
a market for attributes or information. Based on the empirical analysis discussed
above, this would truly be unfortunate.
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